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Abstract 
 
Since their emergence in the 1960s, the ultras have become the dominant form of 
football fandom in Italian football. Their visual style has been adopted across Europe, 
particularly in Southern and Eastern Europe and North Africa. The early development of 
the ultras was characterised by political involvement. Later the identity incorporated 
violence and extreme localism. Since the 1990s, ultras have been co-operating across 
traditional political and local divides in order to challenge legislation and assert ‘their’ 
power over football. Yet this is only in relation to their perceived idea of fandom, not on 
issues of governance. Drawing on ethnographic research in Italy, alongside interviews 
with leading fan-activists across Europe, this paper will highlight the development of the 
ultras and argue that the traditional divisions based on politics and localism are 
beginning to be eroded. This is being replaced with a more co-operative ‘mentalità 
ultras’. Affirming Maffesoli’s (1996) argument that society is not becoming more 
individualised, but in fact new forms of association are emerging. More importantly, 
these ‘neo-tribes’ are tied to consumption. Fundamentally, these changes are tied to the 
rapid globalisation of football that took place through out the 1990s. Increasing 
commercialism tested the ultras’ notion of football fandom. This has also been 
challenged by an increasingly draconian approach from the Italian government 
attempting to control the excesses of the ultras. The unintended consequence of these 
approaches have made it harder for non-ultras to attend the stadium and merely 
reinforced the ultras feelings of persecution and justification that they are the authentic 
voice of football fans. Despite this unified mentality, they are not challenging the 
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authorities on governance aspects. They are continuing to engage in the forms of protest 
they have always engaged in, rather than begin a dialogue. 
 
Key Words: ultras; fans; activism; neo-tribes 
 
 
 
http://www.cinquequotidiano.it/cronaca/periferie/2014/05/06/daspo-5-anni-per-
genny-a-carogna-napoli/#.VC1mpUvA0ds 
 
In July 2014, the Gazzetta dello Sport journalist Andrea Monti (2014) suggested that 
Italian football was at ‘year zero’; it had to start again. This introspection was instigated 
by the Italian national team’s early exit from the World Cup in Brazil. The day after the 
Azzurri was eliminated in the first round, a Napoli fan, Ciro Esposito, died in hospital. A 
Roma fan had shot Esposito before the Coppa Italia final between Napoli and Fiorentina. 
The final is intended to showcase Italian football. Coming at the end of the Serie A 
league season, it brings together to leading Italian clubs in the Stadio Olimpico in Rome. 
Unfortunately the final on 3rd May 2014 showcased another side of Italian football. A 
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confrontation occurred between a Roma fan, Daniele De Santis, and some Napoli fans, 
including Esposito. Shots were fired in the clash; three Napoli fans were injured, with 
Esposito dying from his wounds two months later. As a result of this violence, Napoli 
fans in the stadium became restless. There is a longstanding rivalry between Napoli and 
Roma fans, and many Neapolitans were concerned for their own safety and the wellbeing 
of their fellow fans. In the absence of official information, the Napoli fans started to 
agitate for the game to be delayed or abandoned. Various missiles, including flares, were 
thrown onto the pitch in order to disrupt the start of the match. The central symbol of 
these disturbances became the head of the Napoli ultras, Gennaro De Tommaso. 
Nicknamed, Genny ‘a carogna (Genny the swine), the capo-ultras was seen sitting astride 
the security fences. The authorities attempted to negotiate with Genny ‘a carogna in 
order to allow the game to commence. In the end, the Napoli captain Marek Hamšík 
perusded the ultras to stop, and the game kicked off forty-five minutes late. 
 
These scenes were reminiscent of a similar incident ten years earlier. In the 2004 Rome 
derby between Roma and Lazio, rumours circulated that the police had killed a child. 
The leading ultras of both teams pleaded with the players that  the rumour was true and 
that they should not play the match. The Roma ultras (who included Esposito’s alleged 
killer, Daniele De Santis), entered the field and publically tried to persuade Roma 
talismanic captain, Francesco Totti. Eventually the referee abandoned the match. After 
the match, ultras of both Lazio and Roma joined forces to attack the police.  
 
These two events highlight a significant shift in the development of the ultras. What is 
occurring is a Mentalità Ultras (Doidge, 2015), an ultras mentality that is unifying 
members of groups who would traditionally have been considered rivals. Although the 
traditional local and traditional divisions continue, an overarching ultras identity is 
forming. This Mentalità Ultras is emerging in opposition to various changes in football, 
particularly commercialisation and state ‘repressione’. It is difficult to suggest all ultras 
are homogenous; there are many internal contradictions and interpretations (Numerato, 
2014). Despite this, there are some broad umbrella protests. Even though they claim to 
represent the ‘authentic’ voice of football fans, they are uniting to maintain their own 
privileged position within the patrimonial structure of Italian football. Ultimately they 
 6 
are continuing to engage in the forms of protest that are familiar to the movement – 
banners and violence – rather than constructive dialogue.  
 
The governance of Italian football 
 
In order to understand the events that preceded the Coppa Italia final, it is important to 
place it in context. Many of these issues relate to the ownership structure of Italian 
football clubs. The family approach to capitalism in Italy is replicated in football. Early 
in the sport’s development, clubs were incorporated into the corporate family of leading 
industrialists. This allowed them to extend their patronage to their workers, the local 
community and wider political society (Doidge, 2015). This is clearly illustrated with the 
Agnelli family. Giovanni Agnelli established the car manufacturer Fiat in 1899. His son, 
Edoardo purchased Juvenutus in 1923. The club has been in the family ever since; the 
current president is Andrea Agnelli. Elsewhere, Olivetti and Pirelli became involved with 
AC Milan and Inter respectively in the 1930s. It is clear that through Pirelli’s 
sponsorship of Inter’s jerseys today that they remain part of the corporate structure. 
 
The emergence of Silvio Berlusconi in the 1980s extended this football-industrial 
patronage model. Berlusconi made his money from housing developments, television 
and advertising. In 1986 he purchased AC Milan. He transformed the operation of the 
club by utilising his other business to incentivise fans and promote the club (Scalia, 
2009). This signaled the entry of many new family business groups to purchase football 
clubs. The Tanzi family who owned Parmlat purchased Parma. Sergio Cragnotti, the 
owner of Cirio, became president of Lazio, while the oil tycoon Franco Sensi bought 
Roma. These new industrialists utilised their football clubs to extend their political 
connections and to promote their other businesses. The extent of this entangled network 
was exposed after Italian football encountered a widespread financial crisis in the early 
twentieth century. The financial collapse of companies like Parmalat and Cirio directly 
affected their clubs. More importantly the crisis exposed the fraudulent and accounting 
methods used by clubs and the weakness of the federation at regulation (Porro and 
Russo, 2004; Foot, 2006). As a result of the familial nature of Italian capitalism, foreign 
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ownership has not had the same impact as in England (see Millward, 2011). Only Roma 
and Inter have seen foreign investment.  
 
Unlike the ‘new directors’ (King, 1997) in England, Italian football has not been driven 
purely by the profit motive.  Instead, football provided an important vehicle for political 
patronage (Doidge, 2015). This has led to an interesting relationship between fans and 
owners in Italy.  Portelli (1993) has highlighted how Italian fans valorise the owner who 
provides them with success. Paradoxically, they also resent the fact that they are 
dependent on this owner. Worse, is the fact that the owner does not love the club as 
much as the fans. This ‘love-hate’ relationship directly impacts the role of the ultras, as 
well as their approach to governance. Furthermore, Numerato (2014, p4) argues that 
‘the relationship between supporters and institutions of ‘modern’ football is dynamic and 
blurred’. This is particularly apposite in the Italian case as owners have incorporated 
leading ultras into their patrimonial networks (Doidge, 2015). They have provided 
concessions to sell club merchandise or free tickets to ultras groups in return for their 
compliance. In some cases, ultras have been used in power struggles between directors 
(Scalia, 2009). Others, including Berlusconi, buy players as gifts to the fans. The result is 
that the ultras have gained strong legitimacy with the clubs. This led to the former 
England manager, Fabio Capello, to declare that  ‘In Italy the ultras are in charge’ (La 
Gazzetta dello Sport, 2009).  
 
The development of the ultras 
The ultras are the dominant image of Italian football. They are organised groups of 
predominantly young male fans. Although significant numbers of female ultras exist in 
Italy, they do not dominate in the organising committees (direttivi) or group leaders 
(‘capo’) (Cere, 2002).  Ultras support ‘their’ team with spectacular choreographies of 
banners, flags, flares, and chanting. These features derived from their early 
development. Ultras groups grew out of the supporters clubs in the 1960s. Podaliri and 
Balestri (1998) distinguished four broad phases of development.  The original groups 
developed in the politically turbulent years of the late 1960s and 1970s. Members took 
the banners and chants from the political protests into the stadium. By the late 1970s the 
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ultras started to fragment. New groups emerged in the 1980s that were influenced by 
English hooliganism. The tragic death of a Genoa fan, Vincenzo Spagnolo, in 1995 
signalled a new form of collective mentality, Mentalità Ultras that has united disparate 
groups (Doidge, 2015). Although Testa and Armstrong (2010) call these new groups 
UltraS to delineate them from previous incarnations of the ultras. This suggests that 
there is something fundamentally different with these new groups. As the following 
paragraphs on the historic development of the ultras phenomenon, there are many 
features that continue from previous eras. Whilst they emphasise difference, the 
similarities are also being utilised into a collective identity.  
Despite the newly formed collective identity, difference is central to the ultras way of 
life. De Biasi and Lanfranchi (1997) call this 'the importance of difference'. This is 
reinforced by, Archetti (2001, p.154) who argues that ‘no identity can ever exist by itself 
and without an array of opposites, negatives and contradictions’. Central to this is 
campanilismo, a form of localism. Campanilismo literally means the love of the local 
church’s bell-tower. As the most prominent aural and visual symbol, it delineated the 
local community (Sanga, 1996). Football consequently has become ‘a form of extended 
municipalism’ (Dal Lago and De Biasi 1994, p.72). The football club symbolises 
campanilismo and the image of the city. Significantly for Italy, political identity is also 
important; the political identity of some ultras groups reflects the politics of the city 
(Podaliri and Balestri, 1998; Doidge, 2013a). The local and political influences become 
entwined within the identity of the ultras groups and these help structure the 
interactions of fan groups across the nation. Dal Lago (1990) argues that team sports 
divide participants into friends and foes. The ‘extended municipalism’ has led to 
friendships and rivalries extending across the peninsular. Consequently, ultras exhibit 
what Murphy et al (1990, p.90) calls ‘Bedouin Syndrome’ where ‘the friend of a friend is 
a friend; the friend of an enemy is an enemy’. The result is in the early days of the ultras, 
they had enemies who have longstanding campanilistic rivalries with the city (for 
example, Vicenza and Verona, Livorno and Pisa), or  political foes (for example Livorno 
and Lazio).  
The differences instensified in the 1980s. New groups appeared who were focused on 
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violence (Podaliri and Balestri, 1998). The growth of right-wing politics in wider Italian 
society also saw an outlet on the curve (‘terraces’). Although the political banners of the 
1970s were disappearing, racism and right-wing slogans increased. Campanilsimo 
ensured that the city became a small ‘mother country’ (Podaliri and Balestri (1998, p.95). 
Outsiders were open to be abused. This was prominently seen in relation to teams from 
the south of the peninsular. Reflecting the anti-Southern rhetoric of new political parties 
like the Northern League, ultras groups declared that the south was another country. 
It took the tragic death of Vincenzo Spagnolo to stop the divisions magnifying. The 
ultras were publically demonised after the murder and the backlash led to the ultras of 
traditional rivals of Genoa and Sampdoria to organise a meeting of leading ultras groups 
(Ferreri, 2008; Stefanini, 2009). This signals a move towards what Maffesoli (1996) calls 
a ‘neo-tribe’. Rather than society becoming more individualised, Maffesoli argues that 
although old political and social groups are fragmenting, new ones are forming. 
Significantly for the ultras, these neo-tribes are forming around consumption and ‘tied 
by culture, communication, leisure or fashion, to a commodity’ (Maffesoli 1996, p.81). 
Melucci (1989) and Touraine (1981) have also argued that new forms of political identity 
are forming around consumption. No longer are they based on class-based politics, but 
are often temporary and coalesce around a singular issue. In England these single-issues 
were related to economic changes, stadium renovation, and new forms of ownership 
(King, 2003; Millward, 2011).  
In Italy, the ultras have also united in opposition to the commercial development of 
football. Under the umbrella ‘no to modern football’, the ultras are vocalising their 
opposition to what they see as ‘modern’, commercial football. Opposition under the 
banner of ‘no to modern football’ has taken many forms; including protest banners and 
supporters’ strikes. This provides, as Numerato (2014, p7) argues, ‘a common vocabulary 
and shared experiences enhance the supporters’ sense of solidarity and contribute to the 
development of tactics of protest’. This was reinforced through the development of the 
‘Against Modern Football Manifesto’ that circulated the internet forums of various ultras 
groups in the early twenty-first century. Whilst the manifesto was a significant 
development in the movement, the majority of the protests continued ‘traditional’ ultras 
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forms of protests. This draws on the performative aspects of the ultras style of support 
without entering into dialogue with clubs, federations or government. Ultimately, 
however, the the authorities’ repressione of ultras activities strengthen the collective 
Mentalità Ultras, but this helped to focus attention away from issues of governance.  
 
Repressione and the Mentalità Ultras 
 
The authorities have helped to help create the image of the ultras. Since the 1970s, 
violence has been a part of some ultras repertoire. This has enabled them to be 
constructed as a ‘folk devil’ (Marchi, 2005). After the ‘derby of the dead child’, the media 
speculated whether the ultras had pre-planned the move to protest against new laws 
that could have led their clubs to enter administration. Similarly, the head of Rome’s 
police, Achille Serra, stated that he suspected that the violence was premeditated. As 
Cohen (1972) has argued, the moral panic creates a self-perpetuating cycle that 
necessitates a hard-line approach from the police and government.  
 
Draconian legislation was imposed after the death of a policeman, Filippo Raciti, during 
a riot between Catania and Palermo ultras in 2007. The Pisanu law was imposed in an 
attempt to clamp down on the excesses of the ultras. Additional security barriers were 
erected around stadiums and new regulations were imposed on purchasing tickets. The 
rules governing football banning orders, Daspos (Diffida ad Assistere alle 
manifestazioni Sportive), were also expanded. The problem with these new laws was 
that they were imposed under the Decreto Legge (Decree Laws). These laws are 
permitted in the constitution to impose emergency legislation. Testa (2013) argues that 
these laws bypass parliamentary debate and have created an ad hoc approach to the 
problems in the stadium. An AS Roma fan and lawyer, Lorenzo Contucci (2010) has 
argued that a thorough debate in parliament would produce a more beneficial result. In 
a personal interview he made a similar point about the ‘emotional’, reactive approach to 
Decree Laws: 
 
In Italy when there is confusione you know, when there is an accident in the 
stadium, after two or three days you have a new law. It is an emotional law and 
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sometimes it is not fair and it is not correct. In Italy the Daspo it is done directly 
by the police and there is no control over it. While in England there is a proposal I 
think, by the police, and then there is the judge that gives the banning order.” 
(Lorenzo Contucci, AS Roma and lawyer, personal interview, January 2014). 
 
The authorities also attempted to impose a supporters’ identity card, la tessera del 
tifoso. The idea for the tessera was to make it easier to purchase tickets, to verify that 
fans with Daspos could not enter the stadium, and to allow clubs to market their 
products. An unintended consequence of the introduction of the tessera was to facilitate 
the continued unification of the Mentalità Ultras. Fans of rivals groups put aside their 
political and local differences to unite in opposition to the card’s introduction 
(Guschwan 2013). The teamwork culminated in a national protest held in Rome. Despite 
this collaboration it has not translated into constructive challenges over governance, but 
focussed on the state and the police.  
 
In an attempt to break the power of the ultras, the state has unintentionally helped 
provide the focus for them to unite as outsiders. As Stott and Pearson (2007) argue in 
relation to hooliganism, fans that expect a negative response from the authorities unite 
to protect themselves. This ‘Outsider’ mentality is reinforced through slogans and 
banners prominently displayed by ultras. The police have become the central focus of 
the ultras’ ire. As witnessed after the ‘derby of the dead child’ between Lazio and Roma 
in 2004, the fans of both sides united to attack the police. This hostility to the police can 
be witnessed in ‘ACAB syndrome’ (Stefanini 2009). The acronym for the English term 
‘All Cops Are Bastards’ has become a standard banner amongst many ultras groups 
across Europe. Others include ‘libertà per gli ultras’ (‘Liberty for the ultras’), the slogan 
that appears on T-Shirts and graffiti (Doidge, 2015). The authorities help reinforce this 
approach. In 2008, the derby between Napoli and Roma was preceded by violence. 2000 
Napoli fans without tickets were permitted to travel to Rome and were met with ‘zero 
tolerance’ from the police. The police reinforced their approach by releasing figures 
stating that eight hundred of the two thousand fans had criminal records, including 27 
with links to the Camorra. At the next match, hundreds of Napoli fans demonstrated 
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their ‘Outsider’ status by sporting T-shirts stating, ‘I’ve got a criminal past’ (Hawkey, 
2008).  
 
The authorities’ approach is not just uniting ultras who support the same team. As 
occurred after the ‘derby of the dead child’, rival fans are uniting and displaying 
solidarity with one another. This is not helped by the perceived persecution of the ultras. 
Not only are the security measures called ‘repressione’, but perceived injustices are 
reinforcing the animosity felt by ultras groups. Nine months after Filippo Raciti was 
killed, a Lazio fan was shot and killed by a policeman. Gabriele Sandri was asleep on the 
back seat of a car parked in an Autogrill. Elsewhere there was a confrontation between 
some Juventus and Lazio fans. As it resolved itself, a policeman ran towards them, gun 
drawn, and accidentally fired. The bullet passed through the car and killed Sandri. 
Whereas all games were cancelled after the death of Raciti, the authorities only cancelled 
the Lazio match. In Bergamo, Atalanta fans attempted to have their game cancelled and 
started attacking the Perspex security walls that spate the fans from the pitch. Ultras of 
different club were showing solidarity with Sandri and Lazio; they realised that it could 
have been them accidentally shot by the police. On the anniversary of Sandri’s death, 
Parma fans displayed a banner stating ‘A year has passed, but we have not forgotten: 
justice for Gabriele’. Similar scenes were witnessed in Livorno. On 5th September 2014, 
seventeen year old Davide Bifolco was accidentally shot by a policeman as he ran a 
roadblock in Napoli (Il Fatto Quotidiano, 2014). Even though this was not related to a 
football match, Livorno fans displayed a banner at their match the following week 
declaring, ‘05-09-2014 un altro ‘colpo accidentale’ in questo stato criminale’ (’05-09-
2014 another ‘accidental shot’ in this criminal state’). Livorno ultras were clearly 
showing solidarity with the deceased, whilst reinforcing the culpability of the state. This 
solidarity was also clearly on show in the Coppa Italia final. Genny ‘a carogna was 
sporting a T-Shirt emblazoned with ‘Speziale Libero’. This makes declares that Genny 
wants Antonino Speziale freed from prison. Speziale, was one of the ultras jailed for the 
murder of the policeman Raciti. ‘Speziale Libero’ is beoming a trope of the ultras that 
reinforces ‘ACAB syndrome’ and unites the ultras in opposition to the police.  
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The state ‘repressione’ has clearly not improved conditions in the Italian game. Since the 
death of Raciti, there have been several security incidents in Italian stadiums. In 
addition to the Atalanta fans attacking the stadium after the death of Raciti, the 
ticketless Napoli fans attending Rome, and the delay to the Coppa Italia final, there have 
been other incidents. In particular, Genoa ultras disrupted their match with Siena in 
2012. Genoa was losing to the Tuscan side 4-0 and the ultras decided that the players 
were not fit to wear the shirt. They started throwing flares on the pitch which led to it 
being abandoned. The captain of Genoa, Marco Rossi, went over to negotiate, and was 
ordered to remove his shirt. After discussion with the club’s president, the players all 
removed their shirts. It was only after the intervention of the player Giuseppe Sculli, who 
allegedly has links to the Camorra, that the impasse was resolved. Genoa’s president 
helped reinforce the authority of the ultras by sacking the manager after the match. The 
Italian approach is confrontational. The state seeks to impose its authority over the 
ultras, who in turn, resist this repressione. There is little attempt to engage in a 
dialogue. The ultras are engaging in the forms of protest that has characterised the 
movement since the 1970s. Whilst this can reinforce feelings of solidarity amongst 
participants and engender a collective emotional energy, it does not automatically 
translate into constructive change. 
 
Other forms of fandom 
 
This confrontational approach has minimised the focus of fans. As the most established 
and powerful form of fandom, the ultras dominate discussions about the governance of 
Italian football. Consequently, the issues that they consider to be important are the ones 
that attract resistance. In recent years, the various forms of repressione have united the 
ultras to challenge the authorities. More often than not this is directed at the police. 
Issues like racism are not seen as important in relation to the police and government’s 
approach (Doidge, 2014). The ‘no to modern football’ movement has built some 
momentum away from the ultras, however, and this is nurturing a new approach to 
governance in Italy.  
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Supporters’ Trusts could be a way in which the confrontational approach is broken 
down. As Russo (2013) argues, ‘it will be necessary to work on the football culture to see 
fan involvement as ‘normal’, and realise a virtuous model in which the trust movement 
could be a solution to this crisis’. Supporters’ Trusts are a relatively young movement in 
Italy. These trusts originated in the 1990s out of the Independent Supporters’ 
Association movement in the UK in response to a financial crisis affecting many clubs, 
including Plymouth Argyle, Portsmouth, and Northampton Town. In a short time, a 
number of trusts have been established, from myRoma and Verona col Cuore at Serie A 
clubs to smaller clubs such as Taranto, Arezzo, Modena, Venezia. In 2013, Supporters in 
Campo was initiated to act as an umbrella organisation for supporters’ trusts in Italy. 
This organisation provided the practical and legal support to those establishing trusts. 
Significantly, the organisation also lays down its guiding principles to make community 
involvement central (Doidge, 2015). Campanilismo remains strong within Italian 
fandom. 
 
The challenge for the trust movement in Italy is sustaining a national focus. As witnessed 
with the ultras, shared issues affecting ultras across the nation has brought them 
together to contest the changes in football. King (2003, p.184) observed this in relation 
to supporters’ movements elsewhere in Europe when he argued that: 
 
While it is possible that fans can be mobilised on a national level for certain 
critical developments such as the introduction of all-seater stadiums, it is almost 
impossible to sustain national fan groups beyond a period of crisis. 
 
Groups like Supporters in Campo can provide the centralised resources and the 
emotional space to share information and encouragement to localised trusts. 
Significantly, the supporters’ trust movement did not emerge from the traditional Italian 
forms of support; they were established through interaction with European fans in 
similar situations. This pan-European collaboration is vital in maintaining the focus on 
governance issues at a local level.  
 
Conclusion 
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Civic engagement builds on national and local political traditions. The ultras reflect the 
forms of protest that were originally brought into the stadium in the 1960s. These 
positions have become entrenched in the face of government repressione. Supporters in 
Campo, meanwhile, reflects the new European influence. Fans are engaging in European 
networks and sharing ideas. The danger is that the group identity becomes the reason 
and focus of any form of political action. As Numerato (2014, p14) argues: 
formal institutionalization and expertization can enhance the recognition and 
credibility of protest initiatives. At the same time, the transformative potential of 
the opposition initiatives risks being weakened as the protests become ends in 
themselves. 
The problem with the ultras is that the Mentalità Ultras has become an end in itself. The 
groups are more focused on maintaining what they consider to be an ‘authentic’ form of 
fandom, rather than look to the wider governance issues that are impacting all fans.  
The Mentalità Ultras is becoming a self-reverential trope that exemplifies and valorises 
the ultras style of support. Yet this mentality has been solidified thanks to government 
repressione. Fighting the government and police to maintain their own style of fandom 
has ensured that other issues impacting football are not considered important.  
Crucially, governance doesn’t enter into their idea of ownership. When asking the 
question, ‘whose game is it anyway’, the ultras already think they own it and want to 
continue to assert their approach. As Portelli (1993) argues, they have a ‘love-hate’ 
relationship with the owners of their club. They welcome the success they bring, but hate 
being reliant on someone who does not love their club as much as them. Yet this has 
never been translated into actually taking ownership. Only with a constructive dialogue, 
in collaboration with supporters across Europe, can Italian football start to overcome its 
seemingly inherent state of crisis and begin to build from ‘Year Zero’.  
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